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ABSTRACT  Corporate scandals in the last decade have led to renewed focus by 
auditors and regulators on fraud, risk assessments, and governance reforms. Hernandez 
(2007) documents auditor perceived associations between risk indications or concerns 
on dimensions of management ethics and compensation, performance, governance 
and fraud across auditor risk assessments performed during the continuance stage 
of an audit at a ‘Big Four’ ﬁrm (from 2002 to 2004). Running three separate sets of 
ordinal regressions, this study notes that assessed risk of fraud, perceived corporate 
performance risks, and corporate governance risks are independently associated with 
each other, as well as positively affected by management ethics and integrity concerns 
perceived by auditors and the pressure and balance of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial 
goal-setting targets in management compensation contracts.  This suggests that 
managers and entities focused by ethics, values, and sustainable goals (lower integrity 
concerns, less proﬁts pressure) may present themselves with lower audit risk and 
beneﬁt investors, reducing contracting and agency risks, which may be by simultane-
ously associated with fraud, governance, and overall entity performance risks. I extend 
this result into a theoretical model where the entity and its customers, suppliers, 
regulators, and other stakeholders (‘Five Forces’) share corporate values, lowering 
audit (and entity contracting) risks, resulting in higher entity value.
RELEVANCE FOR PRACTICE  Auditors appear to consider management integrity 
concerns and the balance of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial goal-setting in management 
compensation contracts as important elements affecting the risks of fraud, performance, 
and governance. This study highlights the important beneﬁts that can be achieved in 
broader governance and audit settings from focusing on manager (and corporate) ethics 
and values.
José R Hernandez, PhD
Good Value from Shared Values:
A fraud and risk perspective
investigation is bound to have severe measurement limi-
tations, with only the most remote possibility to reliably 
capture or observe such issues and concerns. Auditors, 
however, are trained in understanding, evaluating, and 
addressing risks in the performance of a financial state-
ment audit and have incentives to do so effectively 
(Zimbelman and Waller, 1999). The auditor risk assess-
ments will be reviewed as a proxy for variables that may 
capture concerns and issues that audit partners observe 
or perceive at their clients. More specifically, results from 
auditor risk assessments performed during the continu-
ance evaluation stage of an audit, approved by audit 
partners at a ‘Big Four’ accountancy firm in the 
Netherlands between the years 2002 through 2004 will be 
discussed.  
Research concepts and propositions will be presented that 
may further our understanding on matters of integrity, 
corporate governance, sustainability, and corporate 
misconduct. The central proposition provided here is that 
relationships between auditor-observed risk factors may 
provide important insights that may be helpful in further 
understanding organizational conditions of heightened 
concern from an integrity, sustainability, performance, 
and corporate governance perspective. Specifically, an 
attempt will be made to identify and evaluate a common 
set of risk factors that auditors observe or perceive to have 
an influence in corporate misconduct, governance, and 
volatile past performance. Accordingly, a link with current 
developments in the fields of ethics and compliance is 
proposed which includes a potential ‘Five Forces’ model 
depicting how ‘good value’ may accrue to various stakehol-
ders from a subscription by various constituents to a set of 
‘corporate values’ and principles. 
This study reflect on results from my dissertation which 
consisted of an in-depth analysis of auditor risk factors 
documented during the client acceptance and continu-
ance stage of an audit (Hernandez, 2007). The focus of the 
1 Introduction
This report aims to empirically evaluate the factors in an 
organization that auditors perceive to influence corpo-
rate misconduct, management integrity, consistency in 
performance and sustainable goals. Such a broad area of 
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dissertation included insights on the various factors that 
auditors appear to associate with fraud risks. Results 
indicated three core findings. First, the “attitude” of a 
company’s management toward engaging in fraudulent 
activity may be the single most important “leg” of the 
fraud triangle (i.e., more important than the other two 
legs “motivation” and “conditions”) from the perspective 
of the partners of the accounting firm providing the data. 
This was an intuitively appealing finding since top 
managers will almost always face a variety of motives to 
misstate earnings and can probably override any controls 
that may or may not be in place – if they are willing to do 
so. Second, auditors consider that pressures placed on 
talented managers to achieve higher profits, consistently 
achieve performance targets, and conform with organiza-
tional practices as important factors associated with frau-
dulent managerial intentions. Third, the dissertation 
presented evidence to suggest that auditors consider the 
integrity and ethics of senior management as the single 
most important fraud red flag (Hernandez, 2007). 
In order to establish the importance of managerial and 
corporate ethics in auditor assessments of fraud, corporate 
governance, performance and target-setting risks, I extend 
initial findings to investigate various auditor risk factors 
across various risk dimensions. This study is particularly 
focused on the effect of management ethics and the 
balance of financial and non-financial goal-setting targets 
in management compensation contracts. Additionally, 
the risk factors that auditors perceive to be associated 
with volatility in past corporate performance and gover-
nance variables as well as the effect of institutional varia-
bles such as a link to the US regulatory system or response 
to major external (fraud) event are investigated. Section 2 
addresses the empirical study design, followed by section 
3 which is a discussion on the results and study methods. 
This article closes (section 4) with a theoretical model on 
the interplay of ‘Five Forces’ (regulators, suppliers, custo-
mers, stakeholders, and the corporation) for good value 
and shared values.
2 Empirical Study Design
The literature has broadly documented an association 
between financial reporting fraud and weaknesses in 
corporate governance, poor financial reporting control 
quality, and earnings management (Beasley, 1996, 2000; 
Carcello, 2000; Dechow et al., 1996; McMullen, 1996). The 
sources of the incentives or situations that lead to various 
fraud opportunities have been extensively investigated. 
Inadequate or inconsistent profitability and emphasis on 
earnings projections have often been associated with fraud 
(Loebbecke et al., 1989; Baucus, 1994; Bell and Carcello, 
2000); the need to act fraudulently occurs when firms lack 
the resources to meet performance goals or to survive, and 
when managers attempt to cope with urgent demands 
(Baucus, 1994); the focus on targets and meeting thresholds 
creates pressure, which start from the need to first, report a 
profit, second, support an increase in profits, and third, 
meet analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge et al., 1999); and manage-
ment incentives have been found important in rational-
izing the desire to engage in earnings management, espe-
cially to beat a benchmark (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
Although, problems such as sustainability, management 
integrity and governance concerns appear to be associated 
with each other and a common set of risk factors, often 
they are studied independently and not as a whole. 
Detecting unethical managers or fraud is difficult, 
perhaps because frauds are rare events (Loebbecke et al., 
1989; Nieschwietz et al., 2000). Additionally, unethical 
fraudulent actions may be perpetrated by highly moti-
vated, clever teams of knowledgeable managers who find 
ways to report fraudulently to remain undetected 
(Nieschwietz et al., 2000). Such talented managers have 
the capacity for considerable political persuasion and inti-
midation of both their own employees and their auditors. 
Managers who have been involved in fraud or restate-
ments are penalized by being subject to criminal or civil 
court actions and by suffering reputation damage and 
facing diminished job prospects. The punishments for 
misconduct are not insignificant: Doeringer (1991) found 
that the perceived fairness of the compensation system 
will contribute to the ethical climate of a company; and 
Desai et al. (2006) found that 60% of restating firms expe-
rience a turnover in at least one top manager within 24 
months of the restatement, compared to only 35% among 
age, size, and industry-matched firms. Further, 85% of the 
displaced managers of restatement firms are unable to 
secure comparable employment afterwards, indicating 
that the labor markets impose significant penalties for 
accounting violations (Desai et al., 2006). Dealing with 
such talented managers makes the work of an Audit 
Committee or Supervisory Board that much more challen-
ging in protecting the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders. In an audit setup, management integrity 
assessments and concerns have been shown to impact the 
persuasiveness of evidence sought and the auditor’s 
assessment of management integrity improved the likeli-
hood of detecting misstatements (Kizirian et al., 2005). 
Further, CFO integrity has been associated with changes 
in auditor risk judgments and to recommendations for 
increasing audit extent and fees (Beaulieu, 2001). 
Generally, there is little research bridging financial repor-
ting risk variables with elements of performance, inte-
grity, and governance and therefore the following hypo-
thesis is suggested:
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H1: Auditors consider the risk of intentional misstatements to be 
associated with conditions of management integrity, consistent 
entity profitability, sustainable management compensation goals, 
and governance quality.
There is a significant body of literature that addresses the 
various capital market and compensation incentives that 
may blind manager judgments or lead to fraud: Erickson 
et al. (2004) found that a one standard deviation increase 
in the proportion of stock-based compensation increases 
the probability of an accounting fraud by approximately 
68%; the likelihood of a misstated set of financial state-
ments increases greatly when the CEO has a sizable 
amount of stock options in-the-money (Efendi et al., 
2007); and, generally, capital market incentives, such as 
equity holdings and stock-option plans, produce perfor-
mance pressures which may induce managers to exert 
productive effort, but also to engage in financial missta-
tements in order to increase senior executive payout 
(Goldman and Slezak, 2003; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004). 
More broadly, from an illegal act perspective, studies have 
identified a significant positive association between the 
likelihood of securities fraud allegations and executive 
stock option incentives (Johnson et al., 2003; Denis et al., 
2006). Within the Netherlands, it is unclear what effect of 
extra-territorial institutional variables may have on 
Dutch companies (such as a link to the US regulatory 
system) or response to an external event (e.g., introduc-
tion of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Ahold accounting fraud of 
$880 Million reported in 2003), and therefore propose the 
following hypothesis:
H2: Institutional variables and external regulatory events affect 
auditor risk assessments.
Empirical research has provided some insights on the 
importance of relationships and various ‘players’ in the 
‘governance mosaic’, including the Audit Committee, 
Board of Directors, Internal and External Auditors, and 
management, in addition to outside stakeholders (Cohen, 
2004). Yet there is little research on how such ‘mosaic’ 
pieces fit together and/or whether having adequate 
governance leads to increased performance or vice-versa. 
I hypothesize that within this governance mosaic, there 
may be a self-selection and inherent forces where gover-
nance variables are associated with better performing 
companies and, conversely, better performing companies 
have higher quality managers and more sustainable goals 
and governance. In turn, hypothesis 1 is re-expressed 
where governance and past (observed) performance (as a 
proxy for future expected performance) are considered 
functions of risk variables observed by auditors at their 
clients.
H3: Auditors consider that corporate governance quality is associ-
ated with conditions of management integrity, consistent manage-
ment performance, and sustainable management compensation 
goals.
H4: Auditors consider that past corporate performance is associ-
ated with conditions of management integrity, sustainable 
management compensation goals, and governance quality.
3 Data, Results and Conclusions
This study is possible due to the availability of a large 
private database of over 4,957 actual client audits 
conducted in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2004. 
This database captures auditor cues and risk judgments at 
the continuance stage of the audit. The questions and 
framed response possibilities are standardized globally by 
the Big 4 audit firm, and the questions used as our 
research instrument stemmed directly from the standard, 
five framed risk levels of Likert-type choices made and 
approved by audit partners: lowest risk, low risk, some 
risk, high risk, highest risk (Appendix 1). Additionally, 
certain binary indicator and control variables are used as 
well. Audit standards are explicit about the auditor’s 
responsibilities to assess the risk of fraud (AICPA, 2002; 
IFAC, 2004), auditors have incentives to identify such risks 
(Zimbelman and Waller, 1999), and auditors tend to have a 
multi-year mandate which allows them to incorporate 
their experiences with their clients in their annual conti-
nuance assessments.
Three groups of ordinal regressions are executed to 
examines the factors and relationships that audit partners 
observe and perceive at their audit clients, consistent with 
the following functions (Hernandez, 2007):
1.  IntentMisstate = IntegrityEthics + SustainableGoals + 
PastPerformance + CorpGovernance + SECRules + 
ListedCompany + PostSOX2002 + PostAhold2003
2.  PastPerformance = IntegrityEthics + SustainableGoals + 
CorpGovernance + SECRules + ListedCompany + 
PostSOX2002 + PostAhold2003
3.  CorpGovernance = IntegrityEthics + SustainableGoals + 
PastPerformance + SECRules + ListedCompany + 
PostSOX2002 + PostAhold2003
In testing Hypothesis 1, results suggest that auditors 
consider the risk of intentional misstatements to be associ-
ated with conditions of management integrity, consistent 
management performance, sustainable management 
compensation goals, and governance quality, all signifi-
cant results at the 99% level. Surprisingly, the statistics do 
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not show any significance for institutional variables nor 
significant regulatory and other events. However, compa-
nies appearing to report under a US GAAP framework did 
appear to be more conservative perhaps attributable to the 
more elaborate rules framework and enforcement conside-
rations (providing some support for H2) on critical fraud 
areas such as revenue recognition and expense capitaliza-
tion. Overall, the results suggest that risk factors of 
management integrity, consistency in past performance, 
balanced goals, and corporate governance contribute to 
auditor fraud risk considerations. 
The second set of ordinal statistics test Hypothesis 3 and 
results suggest that auditors consider that corporate 
governance quality to be associated with conditions of 
management integrity, consistent management perfor-
mance, and sustainable management compensation goals, 
all significant results at the 99% level. Interestingly, insti-
tutional variables such as the company being listed led to 
lower perceived corporate governance risk, with no diffe-
rence in whether the Company had to meet SEC criteria. 
Similarly, there is a mixed result on external events on 
corporate governance, with the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley being significantly negatively associated with 
corporate governance risk, with no significant effect stem-
ming from the Ahold scandal. All this suggests that the 
regulatory shock from the United States may have 
heightened awareness on the importance of governance in 
the Netherlands. 
The last set of ordinal regressions test Hypothesis 4 and 
results suggest that audit partners at the sampled Big 4 
accounting firm consider that past corporate perfor-
mance is associated with conditions of management 
integrity, sustainable management compensation goals, 
and governance quality. In addition, major external 
events such as the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the Ahold scandal appear to have negatively affected 
consistency in performance, perhaps due to uncertainty 
in the capital markets surrounding these events. US 
GAAP reporting, listed company status or being an SEC 
registrant did not appear to be variables affecting consis-
tency in corporate performance, which suggests the 
model is robust.
Overall, I consider these results encouraging in that they 
demonstrate that there are robust and important associa-
tions between risk factors related to dimensions of 
management integrity, corporate performance, sustai-
nable goals, corporate governance, and fraud. Further, 
there is evidence suggesting that institutional variables 
and external events do alter risk considerations (and 
audit partner perceptions) and hence can be used to 
influence auditor assessments (and, potentially, actual 
company actions themselves). This study presents 
evidence that suggest that audit partner risk assessments 
of fraud, perceived corporate performance risks, and 
corporate governance risks are independently associated 
with each other, as well as positively affected by manage-
ment ethics and integrity concerns perceived by auditors 
and the pressure and balance of financial and non-finan-
cial goal-setting targets in management compensation 
contracts.  A potential corollary may be that that mana-
gers and entities focused on ethics, values, and sustai-
nable goals (lower integrity concerns, less profits pres-
sure) may present themselves with lower audit risk and 
benefit investors by reducing contracting and agency 
risks, which may be simultaneously associated with 
lower fraud, governance, and overall entity performance 
risks. This may be good news because ‘investments’ in 
corporate and manager ethics as well as focusing on 
sustainable goals may 1) reduce audit risks and 2) form 
key elements towards an agenda of integrity, sustainabi-
lity and good governance.
4 Future Perspectives: A ‘Five Forces’ Model on 
Good Value and Shared Values
This next section bridges empirical insights with the lite-
rature and regulatory considerations today. From the 
academic perspective, models for corporate illegal beha-
vior (e.g., Baucus, 1994) consider that pressure, opportuni-
ties, and predisposition conditions at a corporation 
interact with individual characteristics to produce illegal 
corporate behavior and corporate crimes. From an 
auditor’s perspective (e.g., IFAC, 2004, 2009), internally 
within a corporation, three groups of risk factors are 
considered to be generally present when material finan-
cial reporting misstatements due to fraud occur covering 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/ratio-
nalizations. 
From a regulatory perspective, there is consensus that an 
adequate set of internal controls are a necessity to safe-
guard against fraud and protect investor interest, where 
control frameworks are used as guidance (e.g., COSO 
internal control or enterprise risk management 
frameworks). Further, American regulatory authorities 
have had great experience in dealing with corporate 
misconduct and suggested on how to deal with such 
corporate illegal matters (e.g., through the United Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines [FSG] Manual and various cases 
where Deferred Prosecution Agreements [DPA] are 
utilized). The major principles of internal control are 
consistent with COSO but they highlight specific matters 
that often do not get sufficient attention: exclude from 
positions of substantial authority any individual that the 
85E JAARGANG  NOVEMBER 577
Figure 1 Five Forces on how Shared Value creates Good Value
Regulators
CustomersSuppliers
The
Corporation
Stakeholders
company knows, or should know, is engaged in illegal or 
unethical activities; monitor, audit, and evaluate the 
corporate ethics and compliance program, as well as 
provide a mechanism for anonymous or confidential 
reporting; promote and enforce the program through 
appropriate incentives and disciplinary measures; and, 
respond appropriately to criminal conduct that is detected 
and act to prevent further similar conduct. All of this 
alludes to the importance placed by US regulators on 
matters of ethics, which would appear to coincide with 
auditor perspectives presented in this study.
Further, DPAs go further and require “appropriate due 
diligence requirements pertaining to the retention and 
oversight of agents and business partners”; “[p]romulga-
tion of compliance standards and procedures … [to] agents, 
consultants, representatives, distributors, teaming part-
ners and joint venture partners”; and “[s]tandard provi-
sions in agreements, contracts, and renewals thereof with 
all agents and business partners which are designed to 
prevent violations of … laws, which provisions may, depen-
ding upon the circumstances, include: (A) anti- corruption 
representations and undertakings relating to compliance… 
(B) rights to conduct audits of the books and records of the 
agent or business partner to ensure compliance with the 
foregoing; and (C) rights to terminate an agent or business 
partner as a result of any violation …” Such a focus on 
external third parties suggests that illegal conduct cannot 
be ‘outsourced’ from a corporation to a third party, but 
rather standards of business conduct should be embraced 
across the supply and distribution chain akin to the 
manner in which safety standards are embedded into the 
automotive or food sector. 
This study shows that managers and entities focused on 
ethics, values, and sustainable goals may present thems-
elves with lower audit risk and may benefit investors. 
Considering that governance, controls, and business 
contracts have the common purpose of aligning goals and 
mitigating agency and contracting risks for a corporation, 
and regulators and stakeholders have vested interests in 
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managing the impact (and risks) of a corporation for 
society, then using a competition model such as Michael 
Porter suggested a ‘Five Forces’ can visualize the exponen-
tial benefit of having ‘shared values.’ Should it be true 
that ‘shared values’ across the ‘five forces’ can lead to lower 
agency and contracting costs, then there may be untapped 
synergies and good value that can accrue to all stakehol-
ders when they communicate and invest in having 
promoting or sustaining such a ‘shared values’ under-
standing. Certain entities may choose to tap on this addi-
tional entity value, using a platform of ‘shared values’ 
based on ethics, integrity and sustainability agenda. There 
could be an economic and societal benefit that can be 
achieved when leading entities achieve a balance across 
the ‘Five Forces’ by analyzing, gathering consensus, and 
promulgating ‘shared values’ that, in turn, may produce 
more ‘value’ to all constituents. I conclude this paper with 
a suggestion that there may exist a model that reduces 
corporate illegality, enhances customer experience, and 
builds a greater sense of corporate sustainability (and 
responsibility) through the ‘Five Forces’ on How Shared 
Value creates Good Value’ visualized in Figure 1. As Vaclav 
Havel once said: “Without commonly shared values and 
José R Hernandez Ph.D. is the CEO of FGI Europe AG, an 
independent management ﬁrm, and a guest at the VU 
University Amsterdam.
widely entrenched moral values and obligations, neither 
the law, nor democratic government, nor even the market 
economy will function properly.” And, this is yet to 
become ever more complex in the age of communication 
(Facebook, Twitter), multinationals becoming more 
global, reshaping of global economies from emerging 
market forces, the ‘rise’ of sustainability and non-govern-
mental initiatives, with many other trends that are 
expected to persist. Therefore, this theoretical ‘Five Forces’ 
model depicting the interplay between regulators, 
suppliers, customers, stakeholders, and the corporation 
may be the way to move forward  by promoting shared 
values, enhancing shareholder value and minimizing 
fraud risk. ■
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Appendix 1 Variable Deﬁnition (Hernandez 2007)
VARIABLE Verbatim question and framed-response options within 
Continuance Risk Assessment
Dimensions Captured
)NTENT-ISSTATE Management inclination to intentionally misstate ﬁnancial reporting:
s   ,OWEST 2ISK -ANAGEMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVE FAIR AND 
accurate ﬁnancial statement presentation.
s   ,OW 2ISK -ANAGEMENT MAKES A REASONABLE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE FAIR AND 
accurate statement presentation.
s   3OME 2ISK -ANAGEMENT IS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN lNANCIAL 
statement presentation but there has been no evidence of intentional 
misstatement.
s   (IGH 2ISK -ANAGEMENT SOMETIMES SHOWS A DISREGARD FOR FAIR AND 
accurate ﬁnancial statement presentation.
s   (IGHEST 2ISK -ANAGEMENT HAS IN THE PAST ATTEMPTED TO DISTORT OR HIDE 
INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE ENTITYS lNANCIAL CONDITION OR OPERATING RESULTS
Variable functions as a dependent variable, as a 
proxy for risk of fraud perceived by audit 
partners and potential indication of corporate 
misconduct.
Likert-scale is used to code the variable, with 
,OWEST 2ISK ASSIGNED A VALUE OF @ AND (IGHEST 
2ISK A VALUE OF @
PastPerformance Past Performance:
s   ,OWEST 2ISK 4HE ENTITY HAS A LONG TRACK RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHING ITS GOALS 
and has adapted well to changing circumstances.
s   ,OW 2ISK 4HE ENTITY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ACCOMPLISHING ITS GOALS AND 
seems able to adapt to changing circumstances.
s   3OME 2ISK 4HE ENTITY HAS HAD MIXED SUCCESS IN ACCOMPLISHING ITS GOALS 
and in adapting to change.
s   (IGH 2ISK 4HE ENTITY HAS OFTEN MISSED ITS GOALS AND HAS NOT ADAPTED WELL 
to change.
s   (IGHEST 2ISK 4HE ENTITY HAS RARELY ACCOMPLISHED ITS GOALS AND OFTEN 
seems to engage in crisis management.
4HIS VARIABLE IS USED AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN 
ONE SET OF ORDINAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS )T ALSO 
functions as an independent variable capturing 
the consistency with which an auditee achieved 
its past performance goals.
Likert-scale is used to code the variable, with 
,OWEST 2ISK ASSIGNED A VALUE OF @ AND (IGHEST 
2ISK A VALUE OF @
CorpGovernance Governance and oversight of management:
s   ,OWEST 2ISK 4HERE IS AN INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORY BOARD WITH BROAD AND 
DEEP EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE )T TAKES AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ENTITYS 
strategic direction, and receives detailed information to monitor closely 
THE PERFORMANCE OF MANAGEMENT 4HERE IS AN AUDIT COMMITTEE WITH 
WELLQUALIlED SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS AND IT HAS THE AUTHORITY AND 
resources to provide vigilant oversight of ﬁnancial matters
s   ,OW 2ISK 4HERE IS AN INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORY BOARD WITH GOOD EXPERTISE 
and experience, and it receives timely information with which to monitor 
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 4HERE IS AN AUDIT COMMITTEE WITH WELLQUALIlED 
supervisory board members that provides oversight of ﬁnancial matters.
s   3OME 2ISK 4HERE ARE SOME SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS WHO ARE 
independent of management, and they have average expertise and 
EXPERIENCE 4HE SUPERVISORY BOARD HAS ADEQUATE INFORMATION WITH WHICH TO 
MONITOR MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 4HERE IS AN AUDIT COMMITTEESUPERVISORY 
board meets regularly and responds to issues that are raised with it.
s   (IGH 2ISK 3ENIOR MANAGEMENT COMPRISES A SINGLE PERSON OR A SMALL 
group. Only a minority of board members are independent of 
MANAGEMENT 4HE OUTSIDE BOARD MEMBERS ARE RELATIVELY PASSIVE AND ARE 
provided with only limited information with which to monitor 
MANAGEMENTS PERFORMANCE 4HERE IS NO AUDIT COMMITTEE OR THERE IS ONE 
but it is not effective.
s   (IGHEST 2ISK 3ENIOR MANAGEMENT COMPRISES A SINGLE PERSON OR A SMALL 
GROUP 4HE SUPERVISORY BOARD IS MADE UP OF PEOPLE WHO LACK EXPERTISE 
information or independence to do anything other than rubber stamp 
APPROVAL OF MANAGEMENTS DECISIONS 4HERE IS NO AUDIT COMMITTEE
4HIS VARIABLE IS USED AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN 
ONE SET OF ORDINAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS )T ALSO 
functions as an independent variable capturing 
OVERALL QUALITY AND OVERSIGHT BY THE 3UPERVISORY 
"OARD AND RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES
Likert-scale is used to code the variable, with 
,OWEST 2ISK ASSIGNED A VALUE OF @ AND (IGHEST 
2ISK A VALUE OF @
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VARIABLE Verbatim question and framed-response options within 
Continuance Risk Assessment
Dimensions Captured
)NTEGRITY!ND%THICS )NTEGRITY AND %THICS
s   ,OWEST 2ISK -ANAGEMENT HAS AN EXCELLENT REPUTATION FOR INTEGRITY AND 
ethics. High ethical standards are evident –for example, a code of conduct 
exists and fully communicated and is enforced throughout the 
organization.
s   ,OW 2ISK -ANAGEMENT HAS A GOOD REPUTATION FOR INTEGRITY AND ETHICS
s   3OME 2ISK 4HERE IS NO REASON TO QUESTION MANAGEMENTS INTEGRITY AND 
ethics.
s   (IGH 2ISK -ANAGEMENTS COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY AND ETHICS IS IN SOME 
doubt.
s   (IGHEST 2ISK 4HERE ARE INDICATIONS BASED ON EMPLOYEE ALLEGATIONS 
REGULATORY INQUIRIES ADVERSE PUBLICITY OR OTHER SOURCES THAT MANAGEMENT 
has engaged in unethical activity.
4HIS VARIABLE CAPTURES INDICATIONS OR CONCERNS ON 
management integrity and ethics perceived or 
noted by the audit partner.
Likert-scale is used to code the variable, with 
,OWEST 2ISK ASSIGNED A VALUE OF @ AND (IGHEST 
2ISK A VALUE OF @
SustainableGoals )NCENTIVE FOR INTENTIONAL -ISSTATEMENTS IN lNANCIAL REPORTING
s   ,OWEST 2ISK )NCENTIVE COMPENSATION IS BALANCED BETWEEN lNANCIAL AND 
non-ﬁnancial measures and limits the opportunity for extraordinary gain 
OR HARDSHIP -ANAGEMENTS PERFORMANCE GOALS APPEAR ACHIEVABLE
s   ,OW 2ISK )NCENTIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IS BALANCED BETWEEN lNANCIAL 
AND NONlNANCIAL MEASURES -ANAGEMENTS PERFORMANCE GOALS ARE HIGH 
but achievable.
s   3OME 2ISK )NCENTIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IS FOCUSED ON 
accounting-based measures. Management is under some pressure to 
achieve targeted results.
s   (IGH 2ISK ! SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION IS 
dependent on accounting-based measures. Management is under 
substantial pressure to achieve targeted results.
s   (IGHEST 2ISK 0OOR PERFORMANCE THREATENS EITHER THE VIABILITY OF THE 
ENTERPRISE OR MANAGEMENTS CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT WITH IT
4HIS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CAPTURES THE LEVEL 
incentives for intentional misstatements framed 
around the balance of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial 
metrics within management compensation 
arrangements.
Likert-scale is used to code the variable, with 
,OWEST 2ISK ASSIGNED A VALUE OF @ AND (IGHEST 
2ISK A VALUE OF @
SECRules )S YOUR #LIENT OR HAS YOUR CLIENT BECOME A ;"IG  &IRM= 3%# !UDIT CLIENT OR THE 
0ARENT 3UBSIDIARY OR @!FlLIATEv OF A 3%# #LIENT WHETHER OR NOT AUDITED BY ;THE 
"IG  &IRM=	 x
-Yes
-No
4HIS BINARY VARIABLE NOTES WHETHER THE AUDIT 
client is covered under SEC reporting rules.
A binary scale is used to identify an SEC client, 
WITH 9ES REPRESENTED BY A VALUE OF @
ListedCompany )S THE COMPANY LISTED ITSELF
-Yes
-No
4HIS BINARY VARIABLE NOTES WHETHER THE AUDIT 
CLIENT IS A LISTED COMPANY ITSELF RATHER THAN JUST 
a subsidiary of a listed company).
A binary scale is used, with Yes represented by a 
VALUE OF @
PostSox2002 ;#ONTINUANCE ASSESSMENTS PERFORMED ON 9EAR  OF THIS STUDY= 4HIS BINARY VARIABLES CAPTURES THE SECOND YEAR OF 
the continuance assessment of the study.
PostAhold2003 ;#ONTINUANCE ASSESSMENTS PERFORMED ON 9EAR  OF THIS STUDY= 4HIS BINARY VARIABLES CAPTURES THE THIRD YEAR OF 
the continuance assessment of the study.
"ASE9EAR ;#ONTINUANCE ASSESSMENTS PERFORMED ON 9EAR  OF THIS STUDY= 4HIS BINARY VARIABLES CAPTURES THE lRST YEAR OF 
the continuance assessment of the study.
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